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Abstract: In this first of two papers, strong limits on the accuracy of physical computation are
established. First it is proven that there cannot be a physical computer C to which one can pose
any and all computational tasks concerning the physical universe. Next it is proven that no physi-
cal computer C can correctly carry out any computational task in the subset of such tasks that can
be posed to C. This result holds whether the computational tasks concern a system that is physi-
cally isolated from C, or instead concern a system that is coupled to C. As a particular example,
this result means that there cannot be a physical computer that can, for any physical system exter-
nal to that computer, take the specification of that external system’s state as input and then cor-
rectly predict its future state before that future state actually occurs; one cannot build a physical
computer that can be assured of correctly “processing information faster than the universe does”.
The results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus,
and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely
on systems that are infinite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold
even if one uses an infinitely fast, infinitely dense computer, with computational powers greater
than that of a Turing Machine. This generality is a direct consequence of the fact that a novel def-
inition of computation — a definition of “physical computation” — is needed to address the
issues considered in these papers. While this definition does not fit into the traditional Chomsky
2hierarchy, the mathematical structure and impossibility results associated with it have parallels in
the mathematics of the Chomsky hierarchy. The second in this pair of papers presents a prelimi-
nary exploration of some of this mathematical structure, including in particular that of prediction
complexity, which is a “physical computation analogue” of algorithmic information complexity. It
is proven in that second paper that either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type
of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information complexity),
in that there is one and only version of it that can be applicable throughout our universe.
3INTRODUCTION
Recently there has been heightened interest in the relationship between physics and computa-
tion ([1-33]). This interest extends far beyond the topic of quantum computation. On the one
hand, physics has been used to investigate the limits on computation imposed by operating com-
puters in the real physical universe. Conversely, there has been speculation concerning the limits
imposed on the physical universe (or at least imposed on our models of the physical universe) by
the need for the universe to process information, as computers do.
To investigate this second issue one would like to know what fundamental distinctions, if any,
there are between the physical universe and a physical computer. To address this issue this first of
a pair of papers begins by establishing that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one
can pose any arbitrary computational task. Accordingly, this paper goes on to consider computer-
indexed subsets of computational tasks, where all the members of any such subset can be posed to
the associated computer. It then proves that one cannot build a computer that can “process infor-
mation faster than the universe”. More precisely, it is shown that one cannot build a computer that
can, for any physical system, correctly predict any aspect of that system’s future state before that
future state actually occurs. This is true even if the prediction problem is restricted to be from the
set of computational tasks that can be posed to the computer.
This asymmetry in computational speeds constitutes a fundamental distinction between the
universe and the set of all physical computers. Its existence casts an interesting light on the ideas
of Fredkin, Landauer and others concerning whether the universe “is” a computer, whether there
are “information-processing restrictions” on the laws of physics, etc. [10, 19]. In a certain sense,
the universe is more powerful than any information-processing system constructed within it could
be. This result can alternatively be viewed as a restriction on the universe as a whole — the uni-
verse cannot support the existence within it of a computer that can process information as fast as it
can.
To establish this result concerning prediction of the future this paper considers a model of
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tasks as well as prediction of the future. In particular, this result does not rely on temporal order-
ings of events, and therefore also establishes that no computer can infallibly predict the past (i.e.,
perform retrodiction). So any memory system must be fallible; the second law cannot be used to
ensure perfectly faultless memory of the past. Accordingly, the psychological arrow of time is not
inviolate [24].1 The results are also general enough to allow arbitrary coupling of the computer
and the external universe. So for example they also establish that there cannot be a device that can
take the specification of any characteristic of the external universe as input and then correctly
observe the value of that characteristic. Similarly, they establish that here cannot be a device that
can take the specification of any desired value of a characteristic of the external universe as input
and then induce that value in that characteristic. In other words, loosely speaking, there cannot be
either an infallible general purpose control device nor an infallible general purpose control device.
(This second interpretation can be viewed as an uncertainty principle that does not involve quan-
tum mechanics.)
There are a number of previous results in the literature related to these results of this paper.
Many authors have shown how to construct Turing Machines out of physical systems (see for
example [10, 22] and references therein). By the usual uncomputability results, there are proper-
ties of such systems that cannot be calculated on a physical Turing machine within a fixed allot-
ment of time (assuming each step in the calculation takes a fixed non-infinitesimal time). In
addition, there have been a number of results explicitly showing how to construct physical sys-
tems whose future state is non-computable, without going through the intermediate step of estab-
lishing computational universality [13, 23].
There are several important respects in which the results of this paper extend this previous
work. All of these previous results rely on infinities of some sort in physically unrealizable sys-
tems (e.g., in [23] an infinite number of steps are needed to construct the physical system whose
future state is not computable). In addition, they all assume one’s computing device is no more
powerful than a Turing machine. Also none of them are motivated by scenarios where the compu-
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consideration of the temporal relation between one’s information and what is to be predicted. Nor
are they extendable to allow arbitrary coupling between the computer and the external universe, as
(for example) in the processes of observation and control.
There are other limitations that apply to many of these previous results individually, while not
applying to each and every one of them. For example, in [23] it is crucial that we are computing
an infinite precision real number rather than a “finite precision” quantity like an integer. As
another example, many of these previous results explicitly require chaotic dynamics (e.g., [7]).
None of the limitations delineated above apply to the result of this paper. In particular, no
physically unrealizable systems, chaotic dynamics, or non-classical dynamics are exploited in this
paper. The results also hold even if one restricts attention to systems which are finite, i.e., which
contain a finite number of degrees of freedom. In all this, the results of this paper constitute a
novel kind of physical unpredictability.
The results also hold even if the computer is infinitely dense and/or infinitely fast (in which
case the speed of light would be infinite). The results also hold even if the computer has an infinite
amount of time to do the calculation. They also hold even if the computer’s initial input explicitly
contains the correct value of the variable it is trying to predict, and more generally they hold
regardless of the program running on the computer. They also hold for both analog and digital
computation, and whether or not the computer’s program can be loaded into its own input (i.e.,
regardless of the computational universality of the computer). Moreover, the results hold regard-
less of the power of one’s computer, so long as it is physically realizable. If it turns out to be phys-
ically possible to have infinitely fast, infinitely dense computers, with computational power
greater than that of a Turing machine, then the result of this paper holds for such a computer. As a
particular example, the results also hold even if the “computer” includes one or more human
beings. So even if Penrose’s musing on quantum gravity and intelligence turns out to have some
validity, it is still true that human intelligence is guaranteed to be wrong sometimes.
The way that this paper derives results of such generality is to examine the underlying issue
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than that of some single precisely specified physical system. The associated mathematics does not
directly involve dynamical systems like Turing machines. Rather it casts computation in terms of
partitions of the space of possible worldlines of the universe. For example, to specify what input a
particular physical computer has at a particular time is to specify a particular subset of all possible
worldlines of the universe; different inputs to the computation correspond to different such sub-
sets. Similar partitions specify outputs of a physical computer. Results concerning the (im)possi-
bility of certain kinds of physical computation are derived by considering the relationship
between these kinds of partitions. In its being defined in terms of such partitions, “physical com-
putation” involves a structure that need not even be instantiated in some particular physically
localized apparatus; the formal definition of a physical computer is general enough to also include
more subtle non-localized dynamical processes unfolding across the entire universe.
Section 1 of this paper generalizes from particular instances of real-world physical computers
that try to “reliably and ahead of time predict the future state of any system” to motivate a broad
formal definition of such computers in terms of partitions. To maintain maximum breadth of the
analysis, we do not want to restrict attention to physical computers that are (or are not) capable of
self-reference. As an alternative, as elaborated at the end of Section 1, we restrict attention to uni-
verses containing at least two such physical computers. (Put another way, our results hold for any
single computer not so powerful as to preclude the possible existence anywhere else in the uni-
verse of another computer as powerful as it is — which certainly describes any computer that
human beings can ever create.) Section 2 begins by proving that there exist prediction problems
that cannot even be posed to one of those two physical computers. Restrictions on the set of pre-
diction problems are introduced accordingly. Section 2 then proves that, even within such a
restricted set of prediction problems, one cannot have a pair of computers each of which can, reli-
ably and ahead of time, predict the future state of any system. This is even true if one allows the
possibility that the computer is initialized by having the correct prediction provided to it.
In their most abstract formulation, the results of this section concern arbitrary calculations a
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they also establish (for example) the necessarily fallible nature of retrodiction, of observation, and
of control. These results are all derived through what is essentially a physical version of a Cretan
Liar’s paradox; they can be viewed as a physical analogue of Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem,
involving two instances of the putative computer rather than self-referential computers.
These issues are addressed in the second of these two papers which, while building on the
results of the first paper, is meant to be self-contained. The second papers begins with a cursory
review of these partition-based definitions and results of the first paper. Despite its being distinct
from the mathematics of the Chomsky hierarchy, as elaborated in that paper, the mathematics and
impossibility results governing these partitions bears many parallels with that of the Chomsky
hierarchy. Section 2 of that second paper explicates some of that mathematical structure, involv-
ing topics ranging from error correction to the (lack of) transitivity of computational predictability
across multiple distinct computers. In particular, results are presented concerning physical com-
putation analogues of the mathematics of Turing machines, e.g., “universal” physical computers,
and Halting theorems for physical computers. In addition, an analogue of algorithmic information
complexity, “prediction complexity”, is elaborated. A task-independent bound is derived on how
much the prediction complexity of a computational task can differ for two different reference uni-
versal physical computers used to solve that task. This bound is similar to the “encoding” bound
governing how much the algorithmic information complexity of a Turing machine calculation can
differ for two reference universal Turing machines. It is then proven that one of two cases must
hold. One is that the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of computation. The
other possibility is that, unlike conventional algorithmic information complexity, its physical
computation analogue is unique, in that there is one and only version of it that can be applicable
throughout our universe.
Throughout these papers, B ≡ {0, 1}, ℜ is defined to be the set of all real numbers, ‘^’ is the
logical and operator, and ‘NOT’ is the logical not operator applied to B. To avoid proliferation of
symbols, often set-delineating curly brackets will be used surrounding a single symbol, in which
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variable. So for example “{y}” refers to the set of all values of the variable y. In addition o(A) is
the cardinality of any set A, and 2A is the power set of A. u ∈ U are the possible states of the uni-
verse, and ^U is the space of allowed trajectories through U. So ^u ∈ ^U is a single-valued map from
t ∈ ℜ to u ∈ U, with ut ≡ ^ut the state of the universe at time t. Note that since the universe is
microscopically deterministic, ut for any t uniquely specifies
^
u. Sometimes there will be implicit
constraints on ^U. For example, we will assume in discussing any particular computer that the
space ^U is restricted to worldlines ^u that contain that computer. An earlier analysis addressing
some of the issues considered in this pair of papers can be found in [30].
I. A DEFINITION OF WHAT IT MEANS TO “PREDICT THE FUTURE”
i) Definition of a Physical Computer
For the purposes of this paper, a physical computer will “predict the state of a system ahead of
time” if the computer is a general emulator of the physical dynamics of such a system, an emula-
tor that operates faster than that dynamics. So given some time T > 0, and given some desired
information concerning the state of some system at T, our goal is to have the computer output that
desired information before time T. To that end we allow the computer to be “initialized” at time 0,
with different “input”, depending on the value of T, what information is desired, perhaps informa-
tion about the current state of the state whose future is being predicted, etc.
To make this concrete, we start by distinguishing the specification of what we want the com-
puter to calculate from the results of that calculation. Let α be the value of a variable delineating
some information concerning the state of the physical universe at time T (e.g., the values of a
finite set of bits concerning the state of a particular system S residing in the universe at that time).
We indicate a specification that we wish to know α as a question q ∈ Q. So q says what α is for
any state of the universe at time T. This means that what we wish our computer to tell us is the
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Since ^u fixes uT and (for a deterministic universe) vice-versa, we can generalize this by dis-
pensing with specification of T. In other words, we can recast any q as any single-valued mapping
from ^u to α. So q fixes a partition over the space ^U, and any pair (α, q) delineates a region in ^U.
In general, the space {α} of “potential answers” of the universe (i.e., the set of partition ele-
ment labels) can change depending on q, the “question concerning the universe” (i.e., the parti-
tion). We will write the space {α} as A(q) when we need to indicate that dependence explicitly.
We formalize all this as follows:
Definition 1: Any question q ∈ Q is a pair, consisting of a set A of answers and a single-valued
function from ^u ∈ ^U to α ∈ A. A(q) indicates the A-component of the pair q.
Here we restrict attention to Q that are non-empty and such that there exist at least two elements
in A(q) for at least one q ∈ Q. We make no other a priori assumptions concerning the spaces
{A(q ∈ Q)} and Q. In particular, we make no assumptions concerning their finiteness.
Without the accompanying q, a value of α, by itself, is meaningless. So we must know what q
was when we read the computer’s output. Accordingly, we take the output of our computer to be a
question q together with an associated prediction for α. (If the question is only stored in a human
user’s memory, then that aspect of the human is implicitly part of the computer.) So our com-
puter’s output is a delineation of a subregion of ^u ∈ ^U; those ^u such that q( ^u ) = α. Choose some
real number τ, where 0 < τ < T. Our goal is that for any q ∈ Q there is an associated initial “input”
state of the computer which ensures that at time τ our computer’s output is a correct prediction for
α, in that for the ^u of the universe, q( ^u ) = α.
Example 1 (conventional prediction of the future): Say that our universe contains a system S
external to our computer that is closed in the time interval [0, T], and let u be the values of the ele-
ments of a set of canonical variables describing the universe. α is the t = T values of the compo-
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nents of u that concern S, measured on some finite grid G of finite precision. q is this definition of
α with G and the like fully specified. (So q is a partition of the space of possible uT, and therefore
of ^U, and α is an element of that partition.) Q is a set of such q’s, differing in G, whose associated
answers our computer can (we hope) predict correctly.
The input to the computer is implicitly reflected in its t = 0 physical state, as our interpretation
of that state. In this example (though not necessarily in general), that input specifies what question
we want answered, i.e., which q and associated T we are interested in. It also delineates one of
several regions R ⊆ ^U, each of which, intuitively, gives the t = 0 state of S. Throughout each such
R, the system S is closed from the rest of the universe during t ∈ [0, T]. The precise R delineated
further specifies a set of possible values of u0 (and therefore of the Hamiltonian describing S), for
example by being an element of a (perhaps irregular) finite precision grid over U0, G'. If, for some
R, q( ^u ) has the same value for all ^u ∈ R, then this input R uniquely specifies what α is for any
associated ^u. If this is not the case, then the R input to the computer does not suffice to answer
question q. So for any q and region R both of which can be specified in the computer’s input, R
must be a subset of a region q-1(α) for some α.
Implicit in this definition is some means for correctly getting the information R into the com-
puter’s input. In practice, this is often done by having had the computer coupled to S sometime
before time 0. As an alternative, rather than specify R in the input, we could have the input contain
a “pointer” telling the computer where to look to get the information R. (The analysis of these
papers holds no matter how the computer gains access to R.) In addition, in practice the input, giv-
ing R, q, and T, is an element of a partition over an “input section” of our computer. In such a
case, the input is itself an element of a finite precision grid over ^U, G". So an element of G" spec-
ifies an element of G (namely q) and element of G' (namely R.)
Given its input, the computer (tries to) form its prediction for α by first running the laws of
physics on a u0 having the specified value as measured on G', according to the specified Hamilto-
nian, up to the specified time T. The computer then applies q(.) to the result. Finally, it writes this
prediction for α onto its output and halts. (More precisely, using some fourth finite precision grid
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G"' over its output section, it “writes out” (what in interpret as) its prediction for what region in U
the universe will be in at T, that prediction being formally equivalent to a prediction of a region
in ^U.) The goal is to have it do this, with the correct value of α, by time τ < T.
Consider again the case where there is in fact a correct prediction, i.e., where R is indeed a
subset of the region q-1(α) for some α. For this case, formally speaking, “all the computer has to
do” in making its prediction is recognize which such region in the partition q that is input to the
computer contains the region R that is also input to the computer. Then it must output the label of
that region in q. In practice though, q and R are usually “encoded” differently, and the computer
must “translate” between those encodings to recognize which region q-1(α) contains R; this trans-
lation constitutes the “computation”.
Consider a conventional computer that consists of a fixed physical dynamical system together
with a pair of mappings by which some of that system’s observable degrees of freedom are inter-
preted as (perhaps binary) “inputs”, and some as “outputs”. More precisely, certain characteristics
of the degrees of freedom of the computer — like whether they exceed a pre-specified threshold,
in the case of a digital computer — are interpreted that way. The input and output degrees of free-
dom can overlap, and may even be identical. Since the computer exists in the physical universe its
state is specified by u. Therefore both the interpretation of some of the computers degrees of free-
dom as “inputs” and some as “outputs” is equivalent to a mapping from u ∈ U to a space of inputs
and of outputs, respectively. All of this holds whether the computation of the outputs from the
inputs proceeds in a “digital” or “analog” fashion.
Under the convention that the initialization of the computer occurs at t = 0, since ^u fixes u0
and vice-versa, we can broaden the definition of a computer’s input, to be a mapping from ^u ∈ ^U
to a space of inputs. So for example “initialization” of a computer as conventionally conceived,
which sets the t = 0 state of a physical system underlying the computer, is simply a special case. In
that special case, the value taken by the input mapping can differ for ^u and ^u' only if the t = 0 state
of the computer portion of the universe, as specified by ^u, differs from the t = 0 state of the com-
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puter portion of the universe as specified by ^u'. Similarly, under the convention that τ is fixed, we
can broaden the definition of a computer’s output to be a mapping from ^u ∈ ^U to a space of out-
puts.
We define a computer by formalizing these considerations:
Definition 2: i) A (computation) partition is a set of disjoint subsets of ^u whose union equals ^U,
or equivalently a single-valued mapping from ^U into a non-empty space of partition-element
labels. Unless stated otherwise, any partition is assumed to contain at least two elements.
ii) In an output partition, the space of partition element labels is a space of possible “outputs”,
{OUT}.
iii) In the current context, where we are interested in prediction, we require {OUT} to be the
space of all pairs {OUTq ∈ Q, OUTα ∈ A(OUTq)}, for some Q and A(.) as defined in Def. (1).
This space — and therefore the associated output partition — is implicitly a function of Q. To
make this explicit, often, rather than an output partition, we will consider the full associated dou-
ble (Q, OUT(.)), where OUT(.) is the output partition ^u ∈ ^U → OUT ∈ {OUTq ∈ Q, OUTα ∈
A(OUTq)}. Also, we will find it useful to use an output partition to define an associated (“predic-
tion”) partition, OUTp(.) : ^u → (A(OUTq( ^u ), OUTα( ^u )).
iv) In an input partition, the space of partition element labels is a space of possible “inputs”,
{IN}.
v) A (physical) computer consists of an input partition and an output partition double. Unless
explicitly stated otherwise, both of those partitions are required to be (separately) surjective.
Since we are restricting attention to non-empty Q, {OUT} is non-empty. We say that OUTq is
the “question posed to the computer”, and OUTα is “the computer’s answer”. The surjectivity of
IN(.) and OUT(.) is a restriction on {IN} and {OUT}, respectively. It reflects the fact that, for rea-
sons of convenience, we don’t allow a value to “officially” be in the space of the computer’s
potential inputs (outputs) if there is no state of the computer that corresponds to that input (out-
put). For example, if the computer is a digital workstation with a kilobyte of its RAM set aside as
input, it makes no sense to have the input space contain more than (28)1024 values.
While motivated in large measure by the task of predicting the future, the definition of physi-
cal computation is far broader, concerning any computation that can be cast in terms of inputs,
questions about physical states of nature, and associated answers. This set of questions includes in
particular any calculation that can be instantiated in a physical system in our universe, whether
that question is a “prediction” or not. All such physically realizable calculations are subject to the
results presented below.
Even in the context of prediction though, the definition of a physical computer presented here
is much broader than computers that work by the process outlined in Ex. 1 (and therefore the
associated theorems are correspondingly further-ranging in their implications). For example, the
computer in Ex. 1 has the laws of physics explicitly built into its “program”. But our definition
allows other kinds of “programs” as well. Our definition also allows other kinds of information
input to the computer besides q and a region R (which together with T constitute the inputs in that
example above). We will only need to require that there be some t = 0 state of the computer that,
by accident or by design, induces the correct prediction at t = τ. This means we do not even
require that the computer’s initial state IN “accurately describes” the t = 0 external universe in any
meaningful sense. Our generalization of Ex. 1 preserves analogues of the grids G (in Q(.)), G" (in
IN(.)) and G"' (in OUT(.)), but not of the grid G'.
In fact, our formal definition of a physical computer broadens what we mean by the “input to
the computer”, IN, even further. While the motivation for our definition, exemplified in Ex. 1, has
the partition IN(.) “fix the initial state of the computer’s inputs section”, that need not be the case.
IN(.) can reflect any attributes of ^u. An “input” — an element of a partition of ^U — need not
even involve the t = 0 state of the physical computer. In other words, as we use the terms here, the
computer’s “input” need not be specified in some t = 0 state of a physical device. Indeed, our def-
inition does not even explicitly delineate the particular physical system within the universe that
we identify with the computer. (A physical computer is simply an input partition together with an
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output partition.) This means we can even choose to have the entire universe “be the computer”.
For our purposes, we do not need tighter restrictions in our definition of a physical computer.
Nonetheless, a pedagogically useful example is any localized physical device in the real world
meeting our limited restrictions. No matter how that device works, it is subject to the impossibility
results described below.
We can also modify the example presented above in other ways not involving input. For exam-
ple, we can have T < 0, so that the “prediction” is of the past. We can also have S be open (or per-
haps even be the entire universe), etc. Although prediction of the future is an important (and
pedagogically useful) special case, our results hold more generally for any calculation a physical
computer might undertake.
As a final example of the freedom allowed by our definition, consider again conventional
computation, where both the input and output mappings reflect the state of the portion of the uni-
verse consisting of some physical system underlying the computer. Now in practice we may want
to physically couple such a computer to the external universe, for example via an observation
apparatus that initializes the computer’s inputs so that they reflect information about the system
being predicted. Such a coupling would be reflected in ^u. If we wish though, we can exploit the
freedom in its definition to modify the input mapping, in such a way that it too directly reflects
this kind of coupling. For example, under the proposed modification, if we want the input section
of the computer’s underlying physical system to be a bit b1 that equals the t = -1 state of some bit
b2 concerning the external universe, then we could have IN( ^u ) = IN(b1(u0), b2(u-1)) = b1(u0) if
b1(u0) = b2(u-1), and have it equal a special “input error” value otherwise. If we do have a physical
coupling mechanism, and if that mechanism is reliable — something reflected in ^u — then this
third setting will never occur, and we can ignore it. However use of this modified IN allows us to
avoid explicitly identifying such a mechanism and simply presume its existence. So long as the
third setting never occurs, we can analyze the system as though it had such a (reliable) physical
coupling mechanism.
We will sometimes find it useful to consider a “copy” of a particular computer C. Intuitively,
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this is any computer C' where the logical implications relating values of IN' and OUT' are the
same as those relating values IN and OUT, so that both computers have the same input-output
mapping.
Definition 2 (v): Given a computer C ≡ {Q, IN, OUT}, define the implication in {OUT} of any
value IN ∈ {IN} to be the set of all OUT ∈ {OUT} consistent with IN, in that ∃ ^u ∈ ^U for which
both IN( ^u ) = IN and OUT( ^u ) = OUT. Then the computer C2 ≡ {Q2, IN2, OUT2} is a copy of the
computer C1 ≡{Q1, IN1, OUT1} iff Q2 = Q1, {IN2} = {IN1} ≡ {IN}, {OUT2} = {OUT1}, and the
implication in {OUT2} of any IN ∈ {IN} is the same as the implication in {OUT1} of that IN.
Note that we don’t require that IN1(.) = IN2(.) in the definition of a copy of a computer; the two
computers are allowed to have different input values for the same ^u. Conversely, any computer is
a copy of itself, a scenario in which IN1(.) does equal IN2(.).
ii) Intelligible computation
Consider a “conventional” physical computer, consisting of an underlying physical system
whose t = 0 state sets IN( ^u ) and whose state at time τ sets OUT( ^u ), as in our example above.
We wish to analyze whether the physical system underlying that computer can calculate the future
sufficiently quickly. In doing so, we do not want to allow any of the “computational load” of the
calculation to be “hidden” in the mappings IN(.) and OUT(.) by which we interpret the underlying
physical system’s state, thereby lessening the computational load on that underlying physical sys-
tem. Stated differently, we wish both the input and the output corresponding to any state of the
underlying physical system to be “immediately and readily intelligible”, rather than requiring
non-trivial subsequent computing before it can be interpreted. As will be seen in our formalization
of this requirement, it is equivalent to stipulating that our computer be flexible enough that there
are no restrictions on the possible questions one can pose to it.
One way to formalize this intelligibility constraint would entail imposing capabilities for self-
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reference onto our computer. This has the major disadvantage of restricting the set of physical
computers under consideration. As an alternative, to formalize the notion that a computer’s inputs
and outputs be “intelligible”, here we consider universes having another computer which can con-
sider the first one. We then require that that second computer be able to directly pose binary ques-
tions about whether the first computer’s prediction correctly corresponds to reality, without
relying on any intervening “translational” computer to interpret that first computer. (Note that
nothing is being said about whether such a question can be correctly answered by the second
computer, simply whether it can be posed to that computer.) So we wish to be able to ask if that
output is one particular value, whether it is another particular value, whether it is one of a certain
set of values, etc. Intuitively, this means that the set Q for the second computer must contain
binary functions of OUT(.) of the first computer. Finally, we also require that the second computer
be similarly intelligible to the first one.
These two requirements are how we impose the intuitive requirement that both computers be
“readily intelligible” as predictions concerning reality; they must be readily intelligible and
checkable to each other. They are formalized and generalized as follows:
Definition 3: Consider a physical computer C ≡ (Q, IN(.), OUT(.)) and a ^U-partition pi. A func-
tion from ^U into B, f, is an intelligibility function (for pi) if
∀ ^u, ^u' ∈ ^U, pi( ^u ) = pi( ^u' ) ⇒ f( ^u ) = f( ^u' ).
A set F of such intelligibility functions is an intelligibility set for pi.
We view any intelligibility function as a question by defining A(f) to be the image of ^U under
f. If F is an intelligibility set for pi and F ⊆ Q, we say that pi is intelligible to C with respect to F. If
the intelligibility set is not specified, it is implicitly understood to be the set of all intelligibility
functions for pi.
We say that two physical computers C1 and C2 are mutually intelligible (with respect to the
pair {Fi}) iff both OUT2 is intelligible to C1 with respect to F2 and OUT1 is intelligible to C2 with
respect to F1.
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Plugging in, pi is intelligible to C iff ∀ intelligibility functions f, ∃ q ∈ OUTq such that q = f, i.e.,
such that A(q) = the image of ^U under f, and such that ∀ ^u ∈ ^U, q( ^u ) = f( ^u ). Note that since pi
contains at least two elements, if pi is intelligible to C, ∃ OUTq ∈ {OUTq} such that A(OUTq) =
B, an OUTq such that A(OUTq) = {0}, and one such that A(OUTq) = {1}. Usually we are inter-
ested in the case where pi is an output partition of a physical computer, as in mutual intelligibility.
Intuitively, an intelligibility function for a partition pi is a mapping from the elements of pi into
B. pi is intelligible to C if Q contains all binary-valued functions of pi, i.e., if C can have posed any
question concerning the universe as measured on pi. This flexibility in C ensures that C’s output
partition isn’t “rigged ahead of time” in favor of some particular question concerning pi. Formally,
by the surjectivity of OUT(.), demanding intelligibility implies that ∃ ^u' ∈ ^U such that ∀ ^u ∈ ^U,
[OUTq( ^u' )]( ^u ) = f( ^u ).
In conventional computation IN(.) specifies the question q ∈ Q we want to pose to the com-
puter (see the example above). In such scenarios, mutual intelligibility restricts how much compu-
tation can be “hidden” in OUT2(.) and IN1(.) (OUT1(.) and IN2(.), respectively) by coupling them,
so that subsets of the range of OUT2(.) are, directly, elements in the range of IN1(.), without any
intervening computational processing.
More prosaically, to motivate intelligibility we can simply note that we wish to be able to pose
to C1 any prediction question we can formulate. In particular, this means we wish to be able to
pose to C1 any questions concerning well-defined aspects of the future state of C2. Now consider
having C2 be a conventional computer based on an underlying physical system. Then we want to
be able to predict C2’s output at time τ as OUT2(uτ). Therefore in addition to any other questions
we might want to be able to pose to it, we want to be able to pose to C1 questions involving the
value OUT2(uτ) (e.g., is that value x1? x1 or x2? x1 or x3? etc.). This is equivalent to requiring
intelligibility.
iii) Predictable computation
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We can now formalize the concept of a physical computer’s “making a correct prediction”
concerning another computer’s future state. We do this as follows:
Definition 4: Consider a physical computer C, partition pi, and intelligibility set for pi, F. We say
that pi is weakly predictable to C with respect to F iff:
i) pi is intelligible to C with respect to F, i.e., F ⊆ OUTq ;
ii) ∀ f ∈ F, ∃ IN ∈ {IN} that weakly induces f, i.e., an IN such that:
IN( ^u )  =  IN
⇒
OUTp( ^u )  =  (A(OUTq( ^u )), OUTα( ^u ))  =  (A(f), f( ^u )).
Intuitively, condition (ii) means that for all questions q in F, there is an input state such that if C is
initialized to that input state, C’s answer to that question q (as evaluated at τ) must be correct. We
will say a computer C' with output OUT'(.) is weakly predictable to another if the partition
OUT'p(.) is. If we just say “predictable” it will be assumed that we mean weak predictability.
This definition of predictable is extremely weak. It only concerns those q ∈ Q that are in F.
Also, it doesn’t even require that there be a sense in which the information input to C is interpret-
able as a description of the external universe. (This freedom is what allows us to avoid formaliz-
ing the concept of whether some input does or does not “correctly describe” the external
universe.) Furthermore, even if the input is interpretable that way, we don’t require that it be cor-
rect. As an example of this, as in conventional computation {IN} could consist of specifications of
t = 0 states of some system S whose future we want to predict, i.e., IN(.) maps the t = 0 state of a
physical system underlying our computer to the space of possible t = 0 states of S. But nothing in
the definition of ‘predictable’ requires that IN( ^u ) correctly specifies the values of those initial
conditions of S; all that matters is that the resulting prediction be correct. Indeed, we don’t even
require that OUTq( ^u ) = q. Even if the computer gets confused about what question it’s answer-
ing, we give it credit if it comes up with the correct answer to our question. In addition, we do not
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even require that the value IN uniquely fixes OUTα( ^u ). There may be two ^u’s both consistent
with IN that nonetheless have different OUTα( ^u ) (and therefore correspond to different values of
q).
Finally, note that none of the times 0, τ or T occur in the definition of ‘predictable’ or in any of
the terms going into that definition. Although we motivated the definition as a way to analyze pre-
diction of the future, it actually encompasses a much broader range of kinds of computation. So
although our results below do govern prediction of the future, they have many other ramification
as well. Most generally, they govern issues concerning sets of potential properties of the uni-
verse’s history. In particular, they govern whether one can always restrict that history together
with the state of a “computer”, itself specified in that history, so that that computer correctly
guesses which of the properties actually holds. (In this, although it is pedagogically helpful, use of
the term “prediction” is a bit misleading.)
Even when there is temporal ordering of inputs, outputs, and the prediction involved in the
computation, they need not have T > τ > 0. We could just as easily have T < τ < 0 or even T < 0 <
τ. So the results presented below will establish the uncomputability of the past as well as of the
future. They also can be viewed as establishing the fallibility of any observation apparatus and of
any control apparatus. These points will be returned to below.
As a formal matter, note that in the definition of predictable, even though f(.) is surjective onto
A(f) (cf. Def. 3), it may be that for some IN, the set of values f( ^u ) takes on when ^u is restricted
so that IN( ^u ) = IN do not cover all of A(f). The reader should also bear in mind that by surjectiv-
ity, ∀ IN ∈ {IN}, ∃ ^u ∈ ^U such that IN( ^u ) = IN.
iv) Distinguishable computers
There is one final definition that we need before we can establish our unpredictability results.
In our analysis below we will need to have a formal definition of what we mean by having two
separate physical computers. The basic idea behind this definition is that just as we require that all
input values IN ∈ {IN} are physically realizable states of a single physical computer, so all pairs
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of the two computer’s inputs values must be physically realizable states of the two physical com-
puters. Intuitively, the computers are not so intertwined that how we can initialize one of them is
determined by how we initialize the other. We formalize this as follows:
Definition 5: Consider a set of n physical computers {Ci ≡ (Qi, INi(.), OUTi(.)) : i = 1, ..., n}. We
say {Ci} is (input) distinguishable iff ∀ n-tuples (IN1 ∈ {IN1}, ..., INn ∈ {INn}), ∃ ^u ∈ ^U such
that ∀ i, INi( ^u ) = INi simultaneously.
We say that {Ci} is pairwise (input) distinguishable if any pair of computers from {Ci} is distin-
guishable, and will sometimes say that any two such computers C1 and C2 “are distinguishable
from each other”. We will also say that {Ci} is a maximal (pairwise) distinguishable set if there
are no physical computers C ∉ {Ci} such that C ∪ {Ci} is a (pairwise) distinguishable set.
2. THE UNCOMPUTABILITY OF THE FUTURE
i) The impossibility of posing arbitrary questions to a computer
Our first result does not even concern the accuracy of prediction. It simply states that for any
pair of physical computers there are always binary-valued questions about the state of the uni-
verse that cannot even be posed to at least one of those physical computers. In particular, this is
true if the second computer is a copy of the first one, or even if it is the same as the first one. (The
result does not rely on input-distinguishability of the two computers — a property that obviously
does not describe the relationship between a computer and itself.) This impossibility holds no
matter what the cardinality of the set of questions that can be posed to the computers (i.e., no mat-
ter what the cardinality of {IN} and/or Q). It is also true no matter how powerful the computers
(and in particular holds even if the computers are more powerful than a Turing Machine), whether
the computers are analog or digital, whether the universe is classical or quantum-mechanical,
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whether or not the computers are quantum computers, and even whether the computers are subject
to physical constraints like the speed of light. In addition the result does not rely on chaotic
dynamics in any manner. All that is required is that the universe contain two (perhaps identical,
perhaps wildly different) physical computers.
Theorem 1: Consider any pair of physical computers {Ci : i = 1, 2}. Either ∃ finite intelligibility
set F2 for C2 such that C2 is not intelligible to C1 with respect to F2, and/or ∃ finite intelligibility
set F1 for C1 such that C1 is not intelligible to C2 with respect to F1.
Proof: Hypothesize that the theorem is false. Then C1 and C2 are mutually intelligible ∀ finite F1
and F2. Now the set of all finite F2 includes any and all intelligibility functions for C2, i.e., any
and all functions taking ^u to a bit whose value is set by the value OUT2( ^u ). The set of those
functions can be bijectively mapped to the power set 2{OUT2}. So F2 ⊆ Q1 ⇒ o(Q1) ≥ o(2{OUT2}).
However o({OUT2}) ≥ o(Q2), since {OUT2} contains all possible specifications of a q2 ∈ Q2.
Therefore o(Q1) ≥ o(2Q2). But it is always true that o(2A) > o(A) for any set A, which means in
particular that o(2Q2) > o(Q2). Accordingly, o(Q1) > o(Q2). Similarly though, o(Q2) > o(Q1).
Therefore o(Q1) > o(Q1), which is impossible. QED.
Ultimately, Thm. 1 holds due to our requiring that our physical computer be capable of
answering more than one kind of question about the future state of the universe. To satisfy this
requirement q cannot be pre-fixed. (In conventional computation, it is specified in the computer’s
input.) But precisely because q is not fixed, for the computer’s output of α to be meaningful it
must be accompanied by specification of q; the computer’s output must be a well-defined region
in ^U. It is this need to specify q as well as α, ultimately, which means that one cannot have two
physical computers both capable of being asked arbitrary questions concerning the output of the
other.
Thm. 1 reflects the fact that while we do not want to have C’s output partition “rigged ahead of
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time” in favor of some single question, we also cannot require too much flexibility of our com-
puter. It is necessary to balance these two considerations. Before analyzing prediction of the
future, to circumvent Thm. 1 we must define a restricted kind of intelligibility set to which Thm. 1
does not apply. This is a set of functions whose value does not depend on the question component
of OUT, only on the answer component. Intuitively, restricting ourselves to these kinds of intelli-
gibility sets means we are only requiring that the predicted partition label of one physical com-
puter be directly readable on the other computer’s input, not that the full partition of the first
computer’s question also be directly readable.
Recall that for any f that is an intelligibility function for (the output partition of) some com-
puter C, ∀ ^u, ^u' ∈ ^U, OUT( ^u ) = OUT( ^u' ) implies that f( ^u ) = f( ^u' ). So for such an f, the joint
condition [OUTq( ^u ) = OUTq( ^u' )] ^ [OUTα( ^u ) = OUTα( ^u' )] implies that f( ^u ) = f( ^u' ). We
consider f’s that obey weaker conditions:
Definition 6: An intelligibility function f for an output partition OUT(.) is question-independent
iff ∀ ^u, ^u' ∈ ^U:
OUTp( ^u )  =  OUTp( ^u' )
⇒
     f( ^u ) = f( ^u' ).
An intelligibility set as a whole is question-independent if all its elements are.
We write C1 > C2 (or equivalently C2 < C1) and say simply that C2 is (weakly) predictable to
C1 (or equivalently that C1 can predict C2) if C2 is weakly predictable to C1 for all question-inde-
pendent finite intelligibility sets for C2.
Similarly, from now on we will say that C2 is intelligible to C1 without specification of an
intelligibility set if C2 is intelligible to C1 with respect to all question-independent finite intelligi-
bility sets for C2.
Intuitively, f is question-independent if its value does not vary with q among any set of q all of
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which share the same A(q). As an example, say our physical computer is a conventional digital
workstation. Have a certain section of the workstation’s RAM be designated the “output section”
of that workstation. That output section is further divided into a “question subsection” designating
(i.e., “containing”) a q, and an “answer subsection” designating an α. Say that for all q that can be
designated by the question subsection A(q) is a single bit, i.e., we are only interested in binary-
valued questions. Then for a question-independent f, the value of f can only depend on whether
the answer subsection contains a 0 or a 1. It cannot vary with the contents of the question subsec-
tion.
As a formal example of question-independent intelligibility, say our computer has questions q
for which A(q) = B, questions q for which A(q) = {0}, and q for which A(q) = {1}, but no others.
Then there are four distinct subsets of ^U, which mutually cover ^U, defined by the four equations
OUTp( ^u ) = (B, 1), OUTp( ^u ) = (B, 0), OUTp( ^u ) = ({1}, 1), and OUTp( ^u ) = ({0}, 0). (The full
partition OUT(.) is a refinement of this 4-way partition, whereas this 4-way partition need not
have no relation with the partitions making up each q in Q.) So a question-independent intelligi-
bility function of our computer is any B-valued function of which of these four subsets a particu-
lar ^u falls into.
In terms of the first of the motivations we introduced for requiring intelligibility, requiring
question-independent intelligibility means we only require each computer’s answer to be readily
intelligible to the other one. We are willing to forego having the question that each computer
thinks it’s answering also be readily intelligible to the other one. Alternatively, we can define a
“partial computer” as a modified kind of computer whose variable OUT is only A(q) and α (rather
than q and α). Intelligibility in the sense originally defined, applied to a partial computer, is
exactly equivalent to applying question-independent intelligibility to a full computer. In particu-
lar, the set of all question-independent intelligibility functions of any output partition OUT(.)
equals the set of all intelligibility functions of the partial computer output partition OUTp(.).
Thm. 1 does not hold if we restrict attention to question-independent intelligibility sets. As an
example, both of our computers could have their output answer subsections be a single bit, and
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both could have their Q contain all four Boolean questions about the state of the other computer’s
output answer bit. (Those are the following functions from ^u ∈ ^U → B: Is u such that the other
computer’s output bit is 1? 0? 1 and/or 0? Neither 1 nor 0?) So the Q of both computers contains
all possible question-independent intelligibility sets for the other computer.
The following example establishes that there are pairs of input-distinguishable physical com-
puters {C1, C2} in which C2 is predictable to C1:
Example 2: Q2 consists of a single question, one which is a binary partition of ^U so that
A(OUT2q( ^u )) = B always. Since OUT2(.) is surjective, the image of ^U under OUT2α(.) is all of
B. Q1 has four elements given by the four logical functions of the bit OUT2α( ^u ). (Note these are
the four intelligibility functions for C2.) Have IN1(.) = OUT1q(.), so that {IN1} contains four ele-
ments corresponding to those four possible questions concerning OUT2α. Next, have OUT1α( ^u )
= [OUT1q( ^u )]( ^u ) ∀ ^u ∈ ^U. Then for any of the four intelligibility functions for C2, q, ∃ IN1 ∈
{IN1} such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1 ⇒ [A(OUT1q( ^u )) = A(q)] ^ [OUT1α( ^u ) = q( ^u )]; simply
choose IN1 = q, so that IN1( ^u ) = IN1 ⇒ OUT1q( ^u ) = q. Finally, to ensure distinguishability, if
there are multiple IN2 values, have each one occur for at least one ^u in each of the subregions
of ^U given by the partition IN1(.).
To ensure surjectivity of OUT1(.), we could have IN1(.) subdivide each of the two sets (one set
for each value of OUT2α) { ^u ∈ ^U : OUT2α( ^u ) = OUT2α} into four non-empty subregions, one
for each IN1 value. So (IN1( ^u ), OUT2α( ^u )) are two-dimensional coordinates of a set of disjoint
regions that form a rectangular array covering ^U. This means that ^u → (IN1( ^u ), OUT2α( ^u )) is
surjective onto {IN1} × {OUT2α}, so that for any OUT1α and intelligibility function for C2, q,
there is always a value of IN1 that both induces the correct prediction for that function q and is
consistent with that OUT2α.
The following variant of Ex. 2 establishes that we could have yet another computer C3 that
predicts C2 but that is also distinguishable from C1:
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Example 2': Have Q3 = Q1, {IN3} = {IN1}, OUT3q(.) = IN3(.), OUT3α( ^u ) = [OUT3q( ^u )]( ^u )
∀ ^u ∈ ^U, and have IN3(.) subdivide IN1(.) so that all four values of IN3 can occur with each value
of IN1. In general, as we vary over all ^u ∈ ^U and therefore over all (IN1, IN3) pairs, the pair of
intelligibility function that C1 is predicting will separately vary from those that C3 is predicting, in
such a way that all 24 pairs of intelligibility functions for C2 are answered correctly for some ^u
∈
^U.
In addition, we can have a computer C4, distinguishable from both C1 and C2, where C4 > C1,
so that C4 > C1 > C2. We can do this either with C4 > C2 or not, as the following variant of Ex. 2
demonstrates:
Example 2": Have OUT4q(.) = IN4(.), OUT4α( ^u ) = [OUT4q( ^u )]( ^u ) ∀ ^u ∈ ^U, and {IN4} =
{OUT4q} equals the set of all 24 question-independent intelligibility functions for C1. (There are
four possible OUT1p: {({0}, 0), ({1}, 1), (B, 0), (B, 1)}.) Ensure surjectivity of OUT4(.) by hav-
ing each region of constant OUT4q( ^u ) overlap each region of constant OUT1p( ^u ).This estab-
lishes that C4 > C1. Distinguishability would then hold if IN4(.) subdivides IN1(.) so that all 16
values of IN4 can occur with each value of IN1.
In this setup, C2 may or may not be predictable to C4. To see how it may not be, consider the
case where {IN2} is a single element (so distinguishability with C2 is never an issue). Have IN4(.)
be a refinement of OUT2α(.), in that each IN4 value can only occur with one or the other of the
two OUT2α values. So each IN4 value delineates a “horizontal strip” of constant OUT2α( ^u ), run-
ning across all four values of IN1( ^u ). (Since IN1( ^u ) = OUT1q( ^u ), and OUT1α( ^u ) =
(OUT1q( ^u ))( ^u ), OUT1α( ^u ) = (IN1( ^u ))( ^u ), so specifying the value of IN1( ^u ) specifies
OUT1p( ^u ), and each strip crosses all four OUT1p values, as was stipulated above.)
Now choose the strip with A(OUT4q( ^u )) = A(IN4( ^u )) = {0} to have coordinate OUT2α( ^u )
= 1, and the strip with A(OUT4q( ^u )) = {1} to have coordinate OUT2α( ^u ) = 0. In the remaining
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fourteen strips, OUT4α( ^u ) is not constant, and therefore is not a single-valued intelligibility
function of the associated (constant) value of OUT2p( ^u ). In both of those two strips though,
OUT4α( ^u ) is the opposite of OUT2α( ^u ). So no IN4 value induces the identity question-indepen-
dent intelligibility function for C2: ^u → ΟUT2α( ^u ), i.e., no IN4 induces OUT4p( ^u ) = (B,
OUT2α( ^u )). Accordingly, C4 does not predict C2.
In other instances though, both C2 and C1 are predictable to C4. To have this we need only
subdivide {IN4} and {OUT4} into two portions, ({IN4}A, {OUT4}A), and ({IN4}B, {OUT4}B),
which divide ^U in two. The first of these portions is used for predictions concerning C2, as in Ex.
2; each region of constant IN4( ^u ) is a subset of a region of constant IN1( ^u ) overlapping both
OUT2α( ^u ). The second is used for predictions concerning C1, as just above. It consists of hori-
zontal strips extending over that part of ^U not taken up by the regions with IN4( ^u ) ∈ {IN4}A. So
{IN4}A = {OUT4q}A contains four elements, and {IN4}B = {OUT4q}B contains sixteen, which
means that {IN} = {OUT} contains twenty elements, all told. Distinguishability is ensured by
having IN4 take on all its possible values within any subset of ^U over which both IN1(.) and IN2(.)
are constant.
ii) The impossibility of assuredly correct prediction
Even if we can pose all the questions in some set to a computer, that says nothing about
whether by appropriate choice of input the computer can always be assured of correctly answer-
ing any question from that set. In fact, even if we restrict attention to question-independent intelli-
gibility sets, no physical computer can be assuredly correct in its predictions concerning the
future.
Whereas the impossibility expressed by Thm. 1 follows from cardinality arguments and the
power set nature of intelligibility sets, the impossibility of assuredly correct prediction follows
from the presence of the negation operator in a (question-independent) intelligibility set. As an
example of the logic underlying the proof, consider a pair of computers predicting the future, both
of whose output answer subsections are binary. Have one of the two computers predict the other’s
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output bit, whereas that other computer predicts the negation of the first one’s output bit. Since
both computers’ output calculations must halt by τ, they will contradict each other when the pre-
diction time arrives. Therefore they cannot both be correct in their predictions.
To formalize this, first note that for any partition pi containing at least two elements, there
exists an intelligibility function f for pi with A(f) = B, an intelligibility function f with A(f) = {1},
and an intelligibility function f with A(f) = {0}. By exploiting the surjectivity of output partitions,
we can extend this result to concern such partitions. This is formally established in the following
lemma, which holds whether or not we assume partitions are binary:
Lemma 1: Consider a physical computer C1. If ∃ any output partition OUT2 that is intelligible to
C1, then ∃ q1 ∈ Q1 such that A(q1) = B, a q1 ∈ Q1 such that A(q1) = {0}, and a q1 ∈ Q1 such that
A(q1) = {1}.
Proof: Since {OUT2} is non-empty, {OUT2q} is non-empty. Pick some q* ∈ {OUT2q} having at
least two elements. (By definition of physical computer, there is at least one such q*.) Construct
any binary-valued function f*2 of α ∈ A(q*) such that there exists at least one α for which f*2(α)
= 0 and at least one for which f*2(α) = 1. Define an associated function f*2( ^u ) = f*2(OUT2α( ^u ))
if A(OUT2q( ^u )) = A(q*), 0 otherwise. By the surjectivity of OUT2(.), ∀ α ∈ A(q*), ∃ ^u such that
both OUT2q( ^u ) = q* and OUT2α( ^u ) = α. Therefore ∃ ^u such that f*2( ^u ) = 1, and ∃ ^u such that
f*2( ^u ) = 0.
This establishes, by construction, that there is a question-independent intelligibility function
for C2 that takes on both the value 1 and the value 0, f*2. So by our hypothesis that C2 is intelligi-
ble to C1 with respect to any question-independent intelligibility function for C2, we know that f*2
∈ Q1. Moreover, viewed as a question, A(f*2) = B. So, we have established that Q1 contains a
binary valued function.
Next, note that the function ^u ∈ ^U → 1 is always a question-independent intelligibility func-
tion for C2, as is the function ^u ∈ ^U → 0. Again using surjectivity, we see that A for these two
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functions are {1} and {0}, respectively. QED.
We can now establish our central theorem:
Theorem 2: Consider any pair of distinguishable physical computers {Ci : i = 1, 2}. It is not pos-
sible that both C1 > C2 and C1 < C2.
Proof: Hypothesize that the theorem is false. Then C1 and C2 are mutually predictable for all
pairs of question-independent intelligibility functions (one function for each computer), and
therefore mutually intelligible for them as well. Therefore Lemma 1 applies. Using the surjectiv-
ity of OUT2(.), this means that ∃ q2 ∈ Q2 such that A(q2) = B and such that there both exists a ^u
∈ ^U such that OUT2( ^u ) = (q2, 0) and a ^u ∈ ^U such that OUT2( ^u ) = (q2, 1). By similar reason-
ing, ∃ q1 ∈ Q1 such that A(q1) = B, and such that there both exists a ^u ∈ ^U such that OUT1( ^u ) =
(q1, 0) and a ^u ∈ ^U such that OUT1( ^u ) = (q1, 1).
Consider the function of ^u ∈ ^U whose value is 1 if OUT2p( ^u ) = (B, 1), 0 otherwise. Like q1,
this is a question-independent intelligibility function for C2, and by our argument just above, we
know it is surjective onto B. Again using mutual intelligibility, this intelligibility function is a q ∈
Q1, q*1. Intuitively, this q for C1 is just the bit of C2’s output answer, for those cases where that
answer is binary. (Our proving surjectivity establishes that there actually are such cases where the
space of answers is binary, and furthermore that among such cases both output answers arise.)
Similarly, ∃ q ∈ Q2, q*2, such that q*2( ^u ) = 1 if OUT1p( ^u ) = (B, 0), 1 otherwise. Intuitively, this
q for C2 is just the negation of the bit of C1’s output answer.
By hypothesis our computers are mutually predictable with respect to any two finite intelligi-
bility sets. Therefore they are mutually predictable with respect to the two (single-element) intel-
ligibility sets for C2 and C1, q*1, and q*2, respectively. Therefore ∃ IN2 such that IN2( ^u ) = IN2
implies that OUT2p( ^u ) = (B, q*2( ^u )). Similarly, ∃ IN1 such that IN1( ^u ) = IN1 implies that
OUT1p( ^u ) = (B, q*1( ^u )). But since our computers are input-distinguishable, ∃ ^u for which both
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IN2( ^u ) = IN2 and IN1( ^u ) = IN1. Therefore ∃ ^u for which A(OUT2q( ^u )) = A(OUT1q( ^u )) = B,
OUT2α( ^u ) = q*2( ^u ), and OUT1α( ^u ) = q*1( ^u ).
Plugging in, for that ^u, A(OUT2q( ^u )) = B, and OUT2α( ^u ) = 1 if OUT1p( ^u ) = (B, 0), 1 oth-
erwise. Similarly, A(OUT1q( ^u )) = B, and OUT1α( ^u ) = 1 if OUT2p( ^u ) = (B, 1), 0 otherwise.
Plugging in again, we have OUT2α( ^u ) = 1 if OUT2α( ^u ) ≠ 1, 0 otherwise. This contradiction
establishes that our hypothesis is wrong, which establishes the theorem. QED.
Restating it, Thm. 2 says that either ∃ finite question-independent intelligibility set for C1, F1,
such that C1 is not predictable to C2 with respect to F1, and/or ∃ finite question-independent intel-
ligibility set for C2, F2, such that C2 is not predictable to C1 with respect to F2.
Thm. 2 holds no matter how large and powerful our computers are; it even holds if the “phys-
ical system underlying” one or both of our computers is the whole universe. It also holds if instead
C2 is the rest of the physical universe external to C1. As a particular instance of this latter case, the
theorem holds even if C1 and C2 are physically isolated from each other ∀ t > 0. (Results similar
to Thm. 2 that rely on physical coupling between the computers are presented in [30].)
Rather than viewing it as imposing limits on computers, Thm. 2 can instead be viewed as
imposing limits on the computational capabilities of the universe as a whole. In this perspective
that theorem establishes that the universe cannot support parallel computation in which all the
nodes are sufficiently powerful to correctly predict each other’s behavior.
iii) Implications of the impossibility of assuredly correct prediction for a single computer
Let C be a computer supposedly capable of correctly predicting the future of any system S if
information concerning the initial state of S is provided to C, as in example 1 above. Assume that
C is not so powerful that the universe is incapable of supporting a copy of C in addition to the
original. (This is certainly true of any C conceivably built by humans.) Have S be such a copy of
C. We assume that for any pair of t = 0 input values, there is at least one world-line of the universe
in which C’s input is one of those values and the other value constitutes the input of C’s copy (i.e.,
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we have input-distinguishability).
Applying Thm. 1 to our two computers, we see that there is a finite intelligibility set that is not
intelligible to C, i.e., there are questions concerning an S that cannot even be posed to C. (More
formally, there is either such a set for C or for its copy, S.) In addition, by Thm. 2, there is a finite
question-independent (and therefore potentially pose-able) intelligibility set concerning S that is
not predictable to C. In other words, there must be a question-independent intelligibility function
concerning S that C predicts incorrectly, no matter what the input to C (assuming the function can
even be posed to C at all).
The binary partition over UT induced by this unpredictable intelligibility function constitutes a
question concerning the time T state of S. In addition every one of the set of potential inputs to C
corresponds to a subset of U0, and therefore corresponds to a subset of the possible states of C’s
“input section” at time 0. (In Ex. 1, IN(.) is set up so that every element in {IN} corresponds to
one and only one state of C’s input section at time 0.) Similarly, every output of C corresponds to
a subset of Uτ and therefore a subset of the possible states of C’s “output section” at time τ.
Accordingly, our result means that there is no input to C at time 0 that will result in C’s output at
time τ having the correct answer to our question concerning the time T state of S. For 0 < τ < T,
this constitutes a formal proof that no computer can predict the future faster than it occurs. (Or
more precisely, that the universe cannot support more than one such computer.) As mentioned
previously, the result also holds for T < 0 however, in which case it denies the possibility of assur-
edly correct prediction of the past.
While these results hold if C and S are isolated from one another ∀ t > 0, they also hold if C
and S are coupled at such times. Indeed, they hold no matter what the form of such coupling. So
in particular, we can have S be a copy of C that is coupled with the original by having that original
“observe” the copy’s output section. Doing this, our result establishes the impossibility of a device
C that can take specification of any characteristic of the universe as input, observe the value of
that characteristic, then report that value and have the value still be true at the time of reporting.
(Note that when a computer is used for observation, its input will in general not uniquely fix its
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output, unlike the case with prediction discussed in Ex. 1.) This impossibility holds independent
of considerations of light-cones and the like, and in fact holds just as well in a universe with c = ∞
as it does in ours. (Alternatively, the time at which the characteristic is to be observed can be spec-
ified in the computer’s input, and therefore can be far enough into the future so that C’s light-cone
can intersect with that of the characteristic.) In all this, Thm. 2 establishes the impossibility of a
general-purpose observation apparatus.
Moreover, there is nothing in the math that forces C to play a “passive observational role” in
the coupling with S. So we can just as well view Thm. 2 as establishing the impossibility of an
apparatus capable of ensuring that there is no discrepancy between the time T value in some phys-
ical computer C’s output section and an associated characteristic of a system S external to C.
There is no such thing as an infallible general-purpose controller.
Whether used for prediction, observation, or control, one can “start” our computer at any time
before t = 0 (i.e., give the computer a potentially semi-infinite “running start”) and our impossibil-
ity results still hold. In addition, it is worth noting that in the context of prediction or observation,
these impossibility results hold even if one tries to have the input to the computer explicitly con-
tains the correct value of the prediction or observation. (Since the universe is single-valued /
deterministic, such a value must exist.) Impossibility also obtains if the input is stochastic (since it
holds for each input value individually). Similarly, although we are primarily interested in com-
puters that run programs which were specifically designed to try to achieve our computational
task, nothing in the theorem requires this. Whatever the program, our result shows that the com-
puter it runs on must have output which never equals the correct answer.
Thm. 2 applies even if we consider human beings, perhaps individually or in a group, perhaps
using physical computational aids, perhaps building special-purpose physical devices, to be the
“underlying physical computers”. Even in a classical, non-chaotic, finite universe, there cannot be
two scientists both of whom are infallible in their calculations (or even their observations) con-
cerning the universe. This is even true if we accept Penrose’s thesis that somehow quantum grav-
ity imbues human beings with extraordinary computational powers. No restrictions are set in the
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theorem on how the computer operates, and there are no explicit assumptions about the computa-
tional power of either the computer or of the universe. Indeed, even if the computer is infinitely
fast and/or dense, or powerful enough to solve the Halting Problem, the theorem still holds.
Impossibility results that are in some senses even stronger than those associated with Thm. 2
hold when we do not restrict ourselves to distinguishable computers, as we do in Thm. 2. For
example, some of those results establish the impossibility of a computer C’s assuredly prediction
even if C is so powerful that the universe is not capable of having more than one copy of C. See
the discussion in the next paper of prediction complexity.
FUTURE WORK AND DISCUSSION
Any results concerning physical computation should, at a minimum, apply to the computer
lying on a scientist’s desk. However that computer is governed by the mathematics of determinis-
tic finite automata, not that of Turing machines. In particular, the impossibility results concerning
Turing machines rely on infinite structures that do not exists in any computer on a scientist’s desk.
Accordingly, it is hard to see why those results should be relevant to a general theory of physical
computers.
On the other hand, when one carefully analyzes actual computers that perform calculations
concerning the physical world, one uncovers a mathematical structure governing those computers
that is replete with its own impossibility results. While much of that structure parallels Turing
machine theory, much of it has no direct analogue in that theory. For example, it has no need for
structures like tapes, moveable heads, internal states, read/write capabilities, and the like, none of
which have any obvious importance to the laws of quantum mechanics and general relativity.
Indeed, when the underlying concepts are stripped down to their essentials, one does not even
need to identify a “computer” with a particular localized region of space-time, never mind one
with heads and the like. In place of all those concepts, one has several partitions over the space of
all worldlines of the universe. Those partitions constitutes a computer’s inputs, the questions it is
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addressing, and its outputs. The impossibility results of physical computation concern the relation
of those partitions. Computers in the conventional, space-time localized sense (the box on your
desk) are simply special examples, with lots of extra restrictions that are unnecessary in the under-
lying mathematics; the general definition of a “physical computer” has no such restrictions.
One can use this definition of a physical computer to establish many restrictions on what is
and is not possible to compute concerning the physical world. The first result is that there cannot
be a computer to which one can even pose all possible questions concerning the physical world. In
light of this result attention is restricted to a subset of questions, all of whose members can actu-
ally be posed to physical computers. Consideration is then focussed on computers that are not so
powerful as to be unique, i.e., computers that can exist in multiple renditions in the physical uni-
verse. It is shown that no such computer can correctly answer all of the computational questions
concerning the physical universe that can be posed to it.
This central result has many implications. The first is that it is impossible for a computer to
take a state of any system as an input, and then always correctly predict the future state of that sys-
tem before it occurs. There must be mistakes made. Loosely speaking, this means that Laplace
was wrong: even if the universe were a giant clock, he would not be able to reliably predict its
future state before it occurred, no matter how smart he was. Phrased differently, regardless of
noise levels and the dimensions and other characteristics of the underlying attractors of the physi-
cal dynamics of various, there cannot be a time-series prediction algorithm [8] that is always cor-
rect in its prediction of the future state of such systems.
The central result follows solely from the relations among the partitions that jointly specify
any physical computer. In particular, it does not rely on physical properties of the universe, like its
quantum nature, the finiteness of the speed of light, the chaotic state of its subcomponents, or the
like. Nor does it make any assumptions concerning a localized physical that may underlie the
physical computer, the Chomsky hierarchy characterization of the computer, or the like. One can
exploit this breadth of the definition of “computer” to extend the central result to address many
other scenarios besides time-series prediction. In particular, that definition places no restrictions
on whether the computer and the system it is predicting are physically coupled. Accordingly, that
central result means that one cannot build a general-purpose observation device that always cor-
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rectly answers an observational question concerning an arbitrary physical system. Similarly,
because of the freedom to have the “computer” be coupled to the external system, the central
result means that one cannot build a general-purpose infallible control device, i.e., one able to
induce a desired state in any specified physical system. These two corollaries of the central result
holds independent of concerns about causal relations and light cones; it holds even for an infinite
speed of light.
The central result serves as one of the foundations for a mathematics of how sets of computers
can be related to one another. For example, say we loosen the assumption that any computer that
can exist in our universe can exist in more than rendition. Then the central result can be used to
establish that the computability relationship among all computers constitutes a directed acyclic
graph. In addition, there is at most one computer that can correctly compute arbitrary questions
concerning all others, i.e., that can infallibly predict/observe/control all others. In addition to ana-
lyzing the mathematics associated with such “god computers”, one can investigate analogues of
the Halting theorem of conventional computer science. That investigation results in a natural com-
plexity measure, one that is analogous to algorithmic information complexity. Unlike algorithmic
information complexity however, the physical computation analogue is uniquely defined, with no
freedom analogous to that in algorithmic information complexity of varying the underlying uni-
versal Turing machine. All these issues and many others are discussed in the second of this pair of
papers.
Future work related to the central result includes investigating the following issues:
i) How must the definitions and associated results be modified for analog computers (so that one
is concerned with amounts of error rather than whether there is an error)? What about if one is cal-
culating the future state of a stochastic system, i.e., if one is predicting a probability distribution?
ii) Are there any modifications to the definitions that would be more appropriate for quantum sys-
tems? If so, how are the ensuing results different for quantum systems? (As an example of such a
modification, one might want to allow sufficient time between T and τ to not run into difficulties
due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.)
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iii) How are the results modified if one is concerned with probabilities of erroneous prediction
rather than just worst-case analysis of whether there can possibly be erroneous prediction? In par-
ticular, how must the results be modified if prediction doesn’t involve a bit of whether the uni-
verse’s actual worldline is or isn’t in some particular subset of all such worldlines (a partition
element), but instead involves full-blown probability distributions over the full set of all world-
lines?
iv) Find the exact point of failure — which according to (1) and (2) must exist — of the intuitive
argument “If the computer is simply a sufficiently large and fast Hamiltonian evolution approxi-
mator, then it can emulate any finite classical non-chaotic system”.
v) A related issue is whether any time a computer actually tries to perform a computation of the
sort invoked in the proofs of (1) and (2) it is forced to a chaotic trajectory, even though evolution
of the combined C-A system in the overall phase space isn’t chaotic (i.e., the region of that phase
space with positive Lyaponov exponent has measure 0)? Or is it perhaps instead the case that the
only kinds of computers one might nominate as capable of predicting any external system are
themselves everywhere chaotic? If this were the case, then in both the proof of (1) and of (2), one
is trying to predict a chaotic system; might that be the answer to the question in (iv) of why those
predictions must be in error? (As an aside, note that if it were the case that only chaotic systems
could conceivably function as universal predictors it would rule out the possibility of 100% effi-
cient error-correcting computers as such universal predictors, since they are designed to not be
chaotic.)
There are reasons to believe this is not the case. For example, the results in this paper don’t
simply say that the computer is unreliable, sometimes getting the correct answer, sometimes the
wrong answer. Rather those results say that there is a scenario where the computer is always
wrong. This makes it hard to see how the “explanation” for these results could lie in chaotic or
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quantum mechanical properties of the computers - one would expect such properties to give unre-
liability, not reliable incorrectness.
vi) As mentioned in the introduction, there is a large body of work showing how to embed TM’s
in physical systems. One topic for future work is following an analogous program in the domain
of physical computation, for example by investigating what physical systems support copies of
any element of various sets of physical computers.
FOOTNOTES
[1] To “remember”, in the present, an event from the past, formally means “predicting” that event
accurately (i.e., retrodicting the event), using only information from the present. Such retrodiction
relies crucially on the second law. Hence, the temporal asymmetry of the second law causes the
temporal asymmetry of memory (we remember the past, not the future). That asymmetry of mem-
ory in turn causes the temporal asymmetry of the psychological arrow of time. “Memory systems
theory” refers to the associated physics of retrodiction; it is the thermodynamic analysis of sys-
tems for transferring information from the past to the present. See [28].
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